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noting shortfalls, and providing recommendations on how the Army can better prepare these formations for this increasingly relevant mission. Additionally, the ongoing debate over establishing a permanent force for SFA is summarized and discussed. is to train, equip, and advise professional security forces; to conduct coordinated counterterrorism missions; and protect the ongoing civilian efforts within Iraq. 2 The BCT-S is not a new formation, but a variant of the standard brigade combat teams which include the infantry, heavy, and Stryker formations. The BCT-S is augmented with additional forces including engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel to enable it to better focus on stability operations. 3 This augmentation is tailored for the mission and area each brigade is assigned. The Army is fully engaged in organizing, training and deploying these formations with eight BCT-S currently scheduled to support Operation Iraqi Freedom as U.S. combat operations in Iraq decrease. LTG Charles Jacoby Jr. recently stated "we think it's the right way to go as we move from counterinsurgency and full spectrum operations to our strategy of being done with combat operations for U.S. forces in August 2010." 4 There has been much debate spurred by the creation of this new role for the modular brigade. Critics have expressed concern that the security force assistance mission is now a sustained requirement and too important to task the brigade combat team to execute as a secondary undertaking. These same critics advocate for permanent advisory formations which can focus their training and education on the necessary stability and security force assistance tasks and principles to properly partner and advise and assist host-nation security forces. This paper will address this debate by researching the initial data from the first BCT-S units identified to deploy in support of the changing mission Iraq. The paper will first examine the new concept of the Brigade Combat Team -Stability by briefly discussing security force assistance and the recent history leading to this new concept. It will also describe the major components, functions, and responsibilities of the BCT-S and explore the pre-deployment training currently being conducted for this relatively new mission. Additionally, the challenges facing the BCT-S formations while preparing to deploy will be discussed as well as the initial lessons learned which can be used to assist subsequent BCT-S units as they prepare for their upcoming missions. Finally, both perspectives of the debate over the utility of the BCT-S will be discussed in the context of the latest data found during the research of this paper. Issues such as these resulted in months of planning and discussion focusing on how to best organize and equip forces to carry out security force assistance missions, while still remaining prepared for the full spectrum of threats. 8 Directing BCTs to morph both organizationally and conceptually to focus on partnered security forces is a logical progression for the modular force as the environment and mission in Iraq have changed. Simply put, the modular force is a group of formations which can be tailored to meet the needs of the combatant commander.
Under the new BCT-S concept, the brigade has become the transition team. 9 As the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Peter Chiarelli stated, "the BCT-(S) is a natural evolution of modularity, the changing nature of the fights in With the evolution of the mission set in Iraq, driving toward security force assistance as the primary mission, and by the change of the scope of the mission to no longer do combat operations in Iraq, it makes absolute sense to embed these transition teams within the brigade, assigned within the brigade. The beauty of this is that it allows the brigade commander to build his teams with those additional senior ranking officers and taskorganize to meet the mission on the ground. He will be organized from the lowest rifle platoon all the way through the brigade headquarters as he embeds himself with his host-nation counterparts. Before, we did business with only the advisory teams being embedded with the hostnation counterparts.
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Organization
The BCT is the cornerstone for Army modularity and can be augmented, based on requirements of the operational environment, with enabling assets and capabilities to support distributed security force assistance. 13 The variant BCT-S is augmented with additional low-density forces as its mission and area of responsibility requires. Typical forces added to a BCT transitioning to a BCT-S are civil affairs, engineer, military police, and transportation personnel. The number and type of these low-density personnel augmentations is based on the operational environment and mission of the BCT-S.
14 For example, a BCT-S given the mission to train, advise, and assist a significant number of police and border security units forces could receive more military police to augment its formation than a BCT-S with mostly army forces in its area of operations.
With these augmentees, the BCT-S is enhanced for security force assistance across the spectrum of conflict, in both permissive and non-permissive environments supporting civilian and military joint and multi-national actors. 15 While envisioned to operate in a permissive environment and not intentioned to conduct offensive and defensive operations as its primary mission, the BCT-S can rapidly shift its emphasis to more 
BCT-S Premission Training
There has been much discussion and debate surrounding the premission training balance of a BCT preparing to transition for BCT-S operations. With a finite amount of training time available between deployments, brigade commanders are confronted with the challenge of how to conduct individual, collective, and leader training on both combat and stability tasks. Criticism charging that BCTs identified for the security force assistance mission conduct too much stability task training and risk losing competency of its perishable combat skills has remained consistent since its inception. Conversely, there is concern that a brigade may focus too much of its available premission training time on war-fighting tasks while neglecting training on the comparatively less-familiar stability tasks required for successful security force assistance operations. As this paper shall illustrate, the initial BCT-S formations to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom have remained conscious of this dilemma and have worked to achieve balance in their premission training.
Initial premission training for the first set of BCT-S formations deploying to Iraq has focused on the core war fighting tasks of the BCT. In keeping with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army's guidance that "the brigade combat team specifically oriented on an advisory and assistance mission will continue to retain its inherent capability to conduct offensive and defensive operations and, if necessary, to rapidly shift the bulk of its operational focus to combat operations," 21 command to address security force assistance. 47 These same critics point to the flexibility and utility of the Army's modular force. They argue that the modular brigade combat team is easily tailored and is the perfect partner to bolster foreign security forces negating the need for an additional one-dimensional formation.
Summarizing the current DOD senior leadership position on this argument, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has recently declared that permanent specialized conventional troop formations are not an efficient use of forces, and that when necessary, conventional forces can be trained and deployed to conduct security force assistance. 48 While the importance of security force assistance is no longer questioned, both sides of this debate provide persuasive arguments for the best course of action to address this important mission now, and for the foreseeable future. With the Army severely constrained by current mission requirements and initial successes reported by units performing the security force assistance mission in theater, the Army should continue to leverage the modular force for this significant mission. As BCT-S formations continue to deploy and return from security force assistance operations, the Army should continue to evaluate their operational effectiveness and monitor the effects on these formations' core competencies and ability to execute full spectrum operations.
Time is needed to fully grasp the value of the BCT-S and whether or not the modular force is the answer to security force assistance requirements prior to establishing another permanent formation which will draw heavily on the Army's already limited resources.
Summary
The importance of stability operations, and in particular security force assistance, has been highlighted by the Army during the past few years of conducting operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has leveraged the modular force and created the BCT-S to spearhead security force assistance efforts in Iraq, assisting and training security forces there as the United States prepares to significantly reduce its footprint there. Even though the Army has not provided significant guidance and direction for the security force assistance mission, BCT-S commanders have embraced this mission and have used imaginative and unconventional methods to train and prepare their units for the advise and assist mission while maintaining their formations' ability to execute fullspectrum operations. The "Big Army", including HQs DA, FORSCOM, and TRADOC, must identify training resources, ensure S-TT personnel are assigned in a timely manner to deploying BCT-S units, and designate a center of excellence to develop doctrine and capture training and operational lessons learned and best practices. While proponents have composed a solid argument for a permanent force of security force specialists, the Brigade Combat Team -Stability has embraced the security force assistance mission and is providing excellent support to Iraqi Security Forces. As multiple brigades deploy and identify lessons learned, time should be given to assess sustained BCT-S operations prior to creating a one-dimensional formation.
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